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The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region in profound political and economic 
upheaval. The last decade alone has seen revolutions and the toppling of governments, civil 
war and internal strife, the rise of non-state militant and terrorist actors, the blurring of 
traditional state borders, forced mass migration, humanitarian catastrophes and widening 
economic inequality. These have sat alongside attempts at economic diversification away 
from hydrocarbons, a growing middle class and rapidly rising demands for the provision of 
more energy, food and water, and the onset of a low-carbon energy transition in a region 
exposed to some of the worst impacts of global climate change yet with only little adaptive 
capacity. With roughly half the proven global oil and natural gas reserves, hydrocarbon rent – 
the ability to extract and receive revenue from the trade of oil and gas – remains a key 
variable for understanding MENA politics. Hydrocarbon resources are distributed unevenly 
across the region with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar as the largest 
producers. Yet even those countries with a comparatively small resource base, like Syria and 
Yemen, have historically relied on oil rent for a significant part of their GDP and government 
budgets. Over time, this has created dependencies that have proved hard to shake. 
 Despite differences in resource endowment, the four countries covered in this analysis 
– Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen – have all been confronted with similar challenges in recent 
years. All four have been locked in an extended period of civil war and instability with 
significant damage to energy infrastructure and high degrees of energy insecurity – here 
understood as the unavailability of sufficient amounts of energy – experienced by large parts 
of their respective populations. The destruction of war followed decades of mismanagement 
and chronic underinvestment in infrastructure across the cases. All four have seen a further 
rise in corruption as compared to pre-civil war figures, with negative implications for 
inclusive economic development and effective energy governance at all levels.  Relatedly, all 
four have experienced a deterioration of state institutions and a significant further erosion of 
public trust in the state’s ability to establish order and provide essential public services, 
including electricity, fuel and water. With state institutions weakened, all four have also seen 
challenges to their territorial integrity and control over hydrocarbons and other resources, 
with various international and regional powers and internal non-state actors wielding 
influence on the ground. 
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The following provides an overview of the key dynamics of energy geopolitics across 
Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, spanning an arch from the state of energy politics and 
infrastructure before the outbreak of the Arab revolutions and the tragedy of civil war to the 
projected impacts of climate change in the MENA region and the implications worsening 
climatic conditions hold for effective reconstruction. Each of the country cases in turn 
highlight the history of energy politics (t-1), followed by the situation as it presents itself 
today (t), incorporating energy institutions and social capital, spatial/ geographic, local and 
cross-border dimensions, and energy and climate security concerns. The conclusion presents 
a number of recommendations for the period of post-war reconstruction (t+1). 
 
II. Iraq  
 
Iraq is OPEC’s second largest crude oil producer and holds the fifth largest oil reserves in the 
world. Since the first year of the Iraq war 2003-04, energy production has increased steadily 
(IEA, 2016a). With this growth has come continued GDP growth despite the many years of 
armed conflict and destruction from which the country only emerged at the end of 2017. 
However, with more than 90 percent of the government budget dependent on oil export 
revenues, Iraq’s financial situation is uncertain in times of fluctuating oil prices. 
Paradoxically, it is oil rent, together with foreign direct investment, that will have to drive an 
urgently needed economic diversification away from oil. Like Libya and Yemen, Iraq is 
experiencing high population growth, with the number of people more than doubling since 
1990. In addition, millions of Iraqis have been displaced and poverty has increased rapidly as 
a consequence of war (World Bank, 2018).  
The rising demands for stable electricity and fuel provision can scarcely be met due to 
damage done to energy infrastructure going as far back as the 1990-91 Gulf War, chronic 
underinvestment by the government and endemic corruption. The grid currently provides 
around 13GW, far below the 21GW peak demand in the summer months, when air 
conditioning needs are highest (Reuters, 2018). Iraq imports some electricity but more cross-
border grid interconnection is needed. In a warming climate, prolonged water shortages have 
had detrimental effects on the country’s agricultural production and civilian water provision. 
Thus, despite the end of sectarian conflict, Iraq will need to address a number of issues for 
any reconstruction to be effective. This includes dealing with continuing unrest and violent 




History of energy politics 
 
The first commercially viable oil field in Iraq was discovered in 1928 in Kirkuk during a 
period when the country was under foreign, in particular British, influence. After the 
arrangement of an “equal profit sharing” agreement with foreign powers in 1952, Iraqi 
leaders moved to increase their national sovereignty over their oil resources (Silverfarb, 
1996). Under the influence of the nationalisation of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company by 
Muhammad Mossadegh in Iran, the Iraqi leader Abdal-Karim Qasim who overthrew the pro-
British monarch Faisal II in 1958, negotiated better conditions for Iraq which led to the so 
called Public Law 80, whereby the Iraq National Oil Company was later established. In the 
1970s, the secular Arab nationalist Ba’ath party came to power and Iraqi affairs were under 
increasing influence of Saddam Hussein, despite the nominal Presidency of Ahmed Hassan 
al-Bakr. Eventually, the Ba’ath party fully nationalised the assets of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company in 1972 (Schwadran, 1977).   
After a period of sustained investment into the oil and gas infrastructure in the 1970s, 
Iraqi oil production stood at 4 million barrels a day in 1979, at the time the third highest in 
the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran (Jaffe, 2007). Two mega-fields have dominated Iraq’s 
historical production: Kirkuk since the 1920s and Rumaila which began operations in the 
1950s. In 1979, Saddam Hussein took absolute power in Iraq and in that year, his government 
issued tenders to explore Iraq’s oil fields at Majnoon, West Qurna, Halfaya, and Nahr Umar 
(Tripp, 2000). In addition, the Iraqi government issued contracts for drilling and the 
expansion of the Al-Bakr terminal (now Al-Basra terminal) with the US firm Brown & Root 
(now KBR), and the 16-tank complex at Fao had just been completed (Mehdi, 2018).   
The Iran-Iraq war between 1980-1988 and in particular the international sanctions 
after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, hit the Iraqi oil sector hard and led to less attention to 
reservoir management and infrastructure development such as pumping stations and 
pipelines. At the same time oil income continued to enable Saddam Hussein to hold on to his 
dictatorship and to suppress the majority Shia population and the Kurds of the country who 
repeatedly revolted against his rule. Saddam Hussein also played the oil card in order to 
subvert the UN oil for food programme which was meant to alleviate the humanitarian 
consequences of the sanctions regime instituted in 1991 (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006).   
The new order brought about after the US invasion of 2003 which ended the rule of 
Saddam Hussein is characterised by economic, political and social challenges. Although Iraq 
rapidly increased its oil output, the security environment in many parts of the country and the 
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political infighting continued to hamper further progress (O’Sullivan, 2011). Hence, in the 
early 2000s, Iraq’s oil production was 2.5m barrels per day (bpd), much lower than in 1979. 
The production further fell to approximately 1.4m bpd following the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. From 2003 till the end of 2007, Iraq’s oil facilities and pipelines were severely 
damaged due to several hundred bomb attacks (Mehdi, 2018). The anarchy during this period 
complicated matters further as looters stole equipment and valuable documents such as logs 
and seismic data.  
The security situation has improved in the last few years, yielding big strides in the oil 
sector. From 2014 to 2016, Iraq was one of the largest contributors to incremental production 
growth in the global oil market, having added approximately 2m bpd between 2009 and 2016 
(Mehdi, 2018). But until today, Iraqis are still facing high levels of unemployment and very 
limited provisions of social and public services from the state. For instance, demand for 
electricity has more than doubled since 2003 while supply increases have been more modest, 
leading to a persistent gap between supply and demand. Protests over power shortages 
repeatedly fuelled angry protests in major Iraqi cities and led to the resignation of the 
Minister of Electricity in summer 2010 (Mohammed and al-Salhy, 2010). Moreover, Iraq’s 
public sector grew significantly during the mid–late 2000s. IMF figures show that 
employment in the public sector tripled from one million in 2004 to three million in 2013 
(IMF, 2017). However, social services in health, education, and electricity did not meet the 
demand of Iraqis as indicated. Despite several ministerial dismissals after recurrent efforts by 
the Prime Minister to contain corruption and after having spent $27 billion on the power 
sector, electricity generated under the relevant ministries actually fell from 4.88 GW in 
August 2009 to approx. 4.7 GW in 2011 (Mehdi, 2018).   
 
Institutions and social contract 
 
The ethnic and sectarian dilemma facing the Iraqi state has repeatedly led to civil unrest and 
is in many ways institutionalised in the so called ‘muhassasa’ system which allocates quotas 
in the Iraqi state along ethnic and sectarian lines (Boduszyński, 2016). As a consequence, key 
governmental posts, including in the oil ministry, are distributed according to a sectarian 
logic. This has led to sectarian political factions controlling key state institutions which in 
turn has given rise to widespread corruption (Aldouri, 2017). The protest movements against 
the Maliki government that began in 2015 were born out of popular discontent over party 
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elites capturing the state, deepening sectarian divisions and failing to provide adequate public 
services, including energy and water, due to unparalleled corruption (Boduszyński, 2016).  
The problems were further exacerbated when ISIS challenged the majority-Shia led 
Maliki government and entangled the country in a costly war which only ended in late 2017. 
The war led to an expansion of Iraq’s war economy and higher budget allocations for defence 
and military purposes, stymieing investment in the energy/oil sector. Ultimately, the call of 
mass Shia mobilisation against ISIS by Ayatollah Sistani, the main Marja-e Taghlid (source 
of emulation, highest Shia clerical rank) of Iraq, created another problem. The so-called 
Hashd al-Shaabi, the umbrella organisation composed of approximately 40 militias that are 
mostly Shia but also include Sunni Muslims, Christians and Yazidis, has emerged as a 
powerful institution in and of itself. It remains to be seen how the Hashd can function as a 
force for stabilisation (or not) in the aftermath of the defeat of ISIS in 2017 and the elections 
in 2018.  
Iraq’s current president Saleh and prime minister Mahdi are known as reformers but 
there are suggestions that they, too, came to power as a result of muhassasa dealings (Dodge, 
2018). The old guard that is seen by Iraqis as responsible for the rampant corruption and 
incompetence within the state thus continues to be rejected. The continuation of violent 
protests in Iraq’s marginalized south, where trust in state institutions has hit rock bottom, is 
indicative of this political trend. Anger among residents of Basra, home to 80 percent of 
Iraq’s oil wealth and the country’s only deep water port, has escalated further after the new 
government failed to appoint any minister from the region, with calls for regional autonomy 
growing louder (Malik, 2018). The continuing instability has potential implications for future 
oil production and exports.  
In Iraq there exists a notion of ‘resource nationalism’. Hence, the decision to invite 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) into Iraq continues to be appropriated by different 
political parties in the country (O’Sullivan, 2011). In 2009, Iraq offered its first bid round for 
the development of some of its largest producing oil fields. Today, the political agenda of 
religious-nationalists such as the controversial cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who is opposed to US 
influence in Iraq’s oil sector, gains a lot of traction among the Iraqi population, not least due 
to the history of European colonialism which lends itself to populist politics. At the same 
time, the US’s former nemesis has worked to counter Iranian influence, choosing to 
participate in the political process as an anti-corruption populist who supports diversifying 
the country’s economy away from an overreliance on oil (Sullivan, 2018). Al-Sadr’s 
supporters have participated in the protest movements since 2015 and his Sairoon electoral 
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list won the 2018 parliamentary elections, capturing 54 seats. It remains to be seen whether 
real progress can be made in reforming state institutions and the energy sector to deliver 
better services and quell public unrest (Taylor, 2018). 
 
Spatial, local and cross-border issues 
 
The question of federalism has pitted the central government in Baghdad against the Kurdish 
quest for more independence. Indeed, the disagreement over regional autonomy for the Kurds 
repeatedly boiled over with reference to the oil rich province of Kirkuk in the country’s north. 
Kurds even went to the polls on 25th September 2017 and overwhelmingly voted for full 
independence of the Kurdish Regional Government despite regional and international 
opposition to the referendum, including sanctions from Iran and Turkey (Dalay, 2017). The 
Kurdish leadership quickly backed down after Baghdad sent tanks to the region resulting in 
the loss of over half of its post-2014 territory, including Kirkuk. In late 2018, however, 
Baghdad and Erbil struck a deal to resume oil flows of up to 100,000 bpd from the Kirkuk oil 
field via the KRI’s pipeline to Turkey which was interpreted as an important step towards the 
easing of tensions between the two sides (Al Jazeera, 2018). Apart from its exports via the 
country’s southern terminal, Iraq depends on the Kurds to transport oil north after ISIL 
destroyed the only other pipeline heading into Turkey. 
  The energy sector in Iraq developed within a context of political transition. Elections 
in 2005 brought about a government dominated by various Shia factions who had entered the 
vote under a single list, the so called United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). Some of these factions, in 
particular the Badr Organization and al-Hakim’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq, have been allied to Iran which has emerged as the main external regional power in the 
country (Arango, 2017; Steinberg, 2017). But apart from political connections, economic 
dependencies have emerged in recent years. Iraq is Iran’s second largest trade partner after 
China and it is dependent on Iran for much of the gas for its power sector. Iranian gas fires up 
to 45 percent of Iraq’s current electricity generation – which is a major energy security and 
geopolitical concern due to continued US sanctions on Iran (Coles and Faucon, 2018). 
However, the US has so far provided temporary sanctions waivers for Iranian gas and 
electricity exports to Iraq to ensure the continued economic growth and recovery of the 
country. Even so, in the summer of 2018, Iran temporarily stopped providing electricity to 
Iraq because of unpaid bills and an increased need in Iran due to a heat wave (Mamouri, 
2018).   
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To reduce its dependence on Iran, close continuing gaps in power provision and 
increase domestic energy security, Iraq has pursued a number of projects aimed at rebuilding 
and rehabilitating infrastructure and adding capacity across the country. In 2017, General 
Electric (GE) signed a contract with the Ministry of Energy to develop electric substations 
and provide critical equipment (Sengul, 2017). GE has a 40-year presence in Iraq and is 
partially responsible for up to 50 percent of all power generation in the country. Together 
with Standard Chartered Bank and the state-run Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), it closed a $600-
million financing agreement to fund Iraq’s ambitious ‘Power Up Plan’ which addresses 
critical electricity generation and maintenance projects throughout the country and could add 
more than 2GW of generation capacity (Arnold, 2018). In Oct 2018, both GE and Siemens 
signed Principles of Cooperation to add 14 and 11 GW of new capacity, respectively (Gnana, 
2018b). The original plans had Siemens build out most of the infrastructure, but GE secured 
its participation after pressure on Baghdad from the Trump administration. 
 To the west, Iraq has enjoyed long-standing economic relations with Jordan, with oil 
as the primary commodity. Indeed, Iraq has historically been one of Jordan’s most important 
sources of oil, shipped by tanker to Jordan’s Red Sea port at Aqaba. In early 2019, both 
countries agreed a trade deal involving the shipment of initially 10,000 bpd to Jordan at 
preferential rates in exchange for reduced tariffs on Iraqi goods imported via Jordan (Reuters, 
2019). There have also been discussions on constructing an oil and gas pipeline connecting 
Iraq’s southern oil fields in Basra to Aqaba. At the same time, however, Jordan has worked to 
improve its own energy security and fiscal situation and reduce imports from Iraq and 
elsewhere by developing its extensive indigenous shale oil reserves, awarding a 40-year 
exploitation contract to a Saudi company in 2018 (Gnana, 2018a). 
 Despite some progress in rebuilding domestic infrastructure and cross-border energy 
trade, outages continue to be a major problem in Iraq. Chronic electricity cuts undermine 
growth and development and the reliable provision of services. The failure to provide 
services, fuel and water has, in turn, led to violent protest in Basra (as discussed above) but it 
has also impacted other cities, including Baghdad, and rural areas. In the summer months, 
when temperatures creep up to 50˚C, the failure to meet electricity needs for cooling is 
particularly acutely felt, with residents of Baghdad describing their lives as “intolerable” 
(Ibrahim, 2018). This has led to the increased use of privately-owned oil-fuelled generators – 
with their owners often making huge windfall profits – as well as a growth in small-scale, 
rooftop solar PV. However, despite excellent solar resources, a mass rollout of solar PV is 
held back by higher upfront costs (despite rapidly falling prices), international firms’ worries 
10 
 




III. Libya  
 
Libya is a member of OPEC and the largest oil supplier in Africa with significant proven oil 
and gas reserves (BP, 2018). Prior to 2011 the country was growing rapidly, focused on the 
exploitation of hydrocarbon rent - roughly 96 percent of government revenues are derived 
from the oil and gas trade (RCREEE 2019). Investment in the power sector was considered 
important and electricity generation more than doubled between 2000 and 2010. In 2010, 
Libya had 6.8GW of installed capacity, with over 99 percent of the population having access 
to electricity and excess generation transported to Egypt. Following the civil war of 2011 and 
the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, the performance of the economy remains driven by 
fossil fuel exports but has been dominated by local splits between different governments, 
warlords and local militias. This has led to a humanitarian crisis, with critical failures in 
healthcare, education, energy provision and clean water. While there is some interest in the 
aluminium, iron, steel and cement industries, this remains a small part of the economy. The 
country is 95 percent desert or semi-desert and access to water and the growth of agriculture 
have been very slow. The remaining 5 percent of the land is suitable for cultivation, yet 
barely 0.5 percent is farmed because of both climate restrictions and water scarcity in the 
region (Wright, 2012). 
 
History of energy politics 
 
Libya’s enormous oil and gas deposits have led to political tensions throughout the country’s 
short history. The nationalization of the Libyan oil industry in the 1970s, including bringing 
the oil sector under the byzantine corporate structures of the Libyan National Oil Corporation 
in 1970, led to inefficiencies that reduced oil production. UN and US sanctions from the mid-
1980s onwards further exacerbated these problems (Otman and Karlberg, 2005). The 
Petroleum Law No. 25/ 1955 was the beginning of a rapid expansion of Libya’s oil sector. 
Between 1955 and 1968, 137 concessions were awarded to 42 companies (Pearson 2003: 7). 
Subsequently, a broad range of foreign companies began exploiting oil on behalf of the 
Libyan government.  After growing criticism about the “colonial” nature of the concessions 
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system across the developing world, the sector looked for other forms of contractual 
agreements between governments and oil and gas companies. Production sharing contracts 
(PSCs) in which the government maintains its ownership of the resource but contracts a 
(foreign) company to extract the resources on its behalf, became the dominant contractual 
agreement in Libya’s oil sector in the early 1970s. The PSCs in place in Libya before the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 were of a somewhat different nature than standard PSCs 
in the upstream oil and gas sector. However, the Libyan government received its share of oil 
prior to cost recovery by companies with the rights to explore and exploit oil and gas (rights 
holders) (Pearson, 2003). Usually, “profit oil” is only made available by lifters after “cost oil” 
has been sold to meet lifters’ costs.  
Following the Gaddafi coup d’état in 1969, the oil industry was nationalized but due 
to the country’s sponsoring of, and direct involvement in, terrorism, relations with the 
international community suffered. Oil sanctions from the US had a major impact, and 
standstill agreements were made between US-companies and the Libyan government. In the 
late 1990s, the Libyan government began increasing the exploration and exploitation of 
natural gas, an industry sector that had existed since the 1960s but had remained 
underdeveloped. Now, the Libyan government wanted to push the exploitation of gas to serve 
the domestic energy market, freeing up oil for export (Pearson, 2003). In 2000, Gaddafi 
abolished the oil ministry and ordered the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) to take over 
ministry’s functions. The Libyan government had a 100 percent ownership of the NOC, 
which was responsible for licensing, contract negotiations and a broad range of policy issues 
in both the country’s upstream and downstream oil sector (Ibid.).  
 In an attempt to affect a rapprochement with the West, the Libyan government began 
reviewing the country’s petroleum law. In June 2003, Gaddafi called for the privatization of 
the oil sector and in the same year, UN sanctions against Libya were lifted, followed by US 
sanctions in 2004 (Barringer, 2003).  While the lifting of sanctions was welcomed by foreign 
companies and the government, the re-entry of foreign-owned operations remained complex.  
Ever since gaining independence in 1951 and the passing of the petroleum law in 1955, Libya 
tried to reduce its dependence on oil through a diversification of the country’s economy, 
though these efforts have not been very successful. While the conditions for a diversification 
of the energy sector towards some renewable energy were conducive in the mid-2000s 
(Otman and Karlberg, 2005), political events associated with the Arab revolutions and the 
ensuing conflict prevented an implementation of the government’s ambitious plans. 
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Control of the country is currently split between two governments, the General 
National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli (which became the National Salvation Government and 
then the High Council of State, now the Presidency Council) and the Government of National 
Accord with its House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, both of which remain contested. 
In addition to the Tobruk and Tripoli factions, there are various local militia and city-states as 
well as local tribes that fight over the legitimacy of office, including a Libya Dawn backed 
Misrata-based government. Most forms of governance in the region, usually a combination of 
political, social and armed actors with varying interests, operates around the exploitation, sale 
and export of hydrocarbons (ECFR, 2016). 
While 2012 saw the end of the first phase of the civil war, with investment returning, 
renewed fighting in 2013-14 caused a near complete shutdown of Libya’s oil industry. While 
the situation stabilized enough to allow for some extraction of oil and gas, local militias 
control many oil sites and extract rents from oil lifters (Natalucci, 2016). In 2016, Khaftar 
Haftar’s Libyan National Army forces took control of the ports, enabling production to 
recover. The political fragmentation of Libya’s political arena has remained extremely 
disruptive to the country’s energy sector however.  
 
Institutions and social capital 
 
Political divisions and fragmentation have a history of undermining the functioning of key 
state institutions, attenuating both legitimacy and control. This is particularly a concern in 
regions where access to hydrocarbon revenues dominates the economy and the ability to fund 
delivery of basic goods and services. Divisions resulting from feuds between a multitude of 
groups over government authority have greatly undermined the (already weak) capacity of 
the state to deliver public services to Libyans. Revenues from hydrocarbon sales were being 
transferred directly to the central bank, which then used the funds to pay off militia and 
security services for fear of reprisals (Freeman, 2016). Failure to implement reforms, 
maintain infrastructure and manage distribution and export mean loss of revenue, as was seen 
in the standoff between the Libyan National Army and the NOC in summer 2018 
(International Crisis Group, 2018).  This in turn impacts state capacity to provide electricity 
and fuel to citizens, which itself impacts the ability for the economy to function and can 
result in significant failures in service provision.  
The political fragmentation since 2011 has greatly undermined Libya’s capacity to 
harness its oil resources in an effective and equitable manner. The internationally recognized 
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government in Tripoli does not enjoy much legitimacy in Libya. Consequently, the 
relationship between state institutions and Libyans is heavily strained. Competing power 
centers combined with limited capacity for coercion or enforcement mean that local actors/ 
militias have taken responsibility for the provision of local services (Lacher and Al-Idrissi, 
2018). A large number of Libyans are also therefore subject to violence and intimidation by 
local militias. 
Competing factions control different segments of the oil and gas sector, while a 
vibrant black market for the export of natural resources has emerged since 2011. As of 2018, 
the main factions were the GNA led by the Presidency Council, the HoR and Khaftar’s LNA 
(ECFC, 2019). The GNA was formed in the aftermath of the Libyan Political Agreement 
(LPA) that was established under the auspices of the United Nations in December 2015 in an 
attempt to broker a peace between groups that had been feuding since 2011. While the 
international community recognizes the GNA as the legitimate government of Libya its 
authority is confined to the city of Tripoli and its immediate surroundings. Other parties to 
the conflict include the Libyan National Army (LNA), which consists of local militias, as 
well as the LNA’s opponent, the Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB), and its allies such as the 
Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamist Shura Council of Benghazi (ISCB), both of whom have ties 
to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Kabouche, 2018). 
Legally, the exploration and exploitation of Libya’s oil resources is under the 
authority of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) but due to the country’s political 
fragmentation, the exploitation of oil has become very volatile. Not only have groups 
opposing the government in Tripoli established their own NOC, often referred to as the 
“Eastern NOC” (Kabouche, 2018) and tried to sign contracts with international lifters, but 
aforementioned factions actively fought over control of the country’s energy infrastructure at 
the time of writing. In addition to political instability preventing an ordered exploitation of 
Libya’s natural resources, corruption is systemic and endemic in Libya, eroding trust in 
institutions and further discouraging much needed investments in the country’s energy sector. 
While the relatively centralized government structures under Gaddafi provided a certain level 
of certainty for corrupt activities (if one paid, one would get an export license), the 
factionalism that has characterized Libyan politics since 2011 has deregulated corruption and 
made corrupt activities less predictable (Wijaya and Shariha, 2016). In 2018, Libya ranked 
171 of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  
Differences in official and black market exchange rates, which encourages smuggling, 
the absence of law enforcement as well as political instability have allowed unscrupulous 
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players to syphon off most of Libya’s oil and gas revenues, which constitute 95 percent of the 
country’s exports. Meanwhile, around 30 percent of the population continues to live in 
poverty despite the country’s abundance in natural resources (Armitage, 2018). 
Unemployment has increased considerably as a result of the fighting. Around 85 percent of 
Libya’s labor force worked in the public sector before the war, an exceptionally high figure 
even for a region where the state has traditionally loomed large in local economies. 
Unemployment rose after 2011 across all age groups but skyrocketed among Libyan youth. In 
2016, youth unemployment stood at 48 percent while 25 percent of women were without 
work (Fasanotti, 2016). Even if employment was available, only 15-30 percent of Libyans 
would be considered skilled enough to participate in a modern labor market. The re-
integration of combatants into the labor force is another challenge the country is facing 
(Ibid.).  
 
Spatial, local and cross-border issues 
 
Hydrocarbon energy sources and critical energy infrastructure (ports, pipelines, power plants, 
roads, and grids) are geographically distributed across Libya and control over them is heavily 
contested, falling along political, cultural, geographic and often historically determined fault 
lines. For example, the divide has resulted in both attacks on the network and the physical 
break-up of the electricity grid. Libya’s electricity grid has been separated into four isolated 
grids due to damage, mostly inflicted during the 2014 fighting, and ongoing intermittent 
attacks continue. The interruption of cross-border electricity trading, through the loss of 
interconnectors with Tunisia and Egypt, meant a further loss of up to 600MW of power 
overall (World Bank, 2017a), although GECOL has since re-established a connection with 
Egypt and there are plans for new power plants (ESI, 2017).  While installed capacity is 
9.7GW there is available capacity of just under 55 percent (Ibid.) due to maintenance 
challenges and the impact of fighting. In 2018 GECOL said that the cost of vandalism and 
attacks on the system since the civil war was over $1.6 billion (Newsbase, 2018).   
In Libya, the contracts to produce, purchase, and transport crude signed with the 
Libyan National Oil Corporation guarantee that all payments for oil exports flow into the 
Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya. Yet two-thirds of the country’s oil is in the HoR 
controlled East, where 80 percent of its refineries and five out of its six export terminals are 
based.  This creates a check point where political and military pressure can be placed and has 
resulted in many of the continuing problems in both extracting and exporting oil (Eaton, 
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2018). This has ranged from 600,000 bpd in March 2015 compared to a 78 percent increase 
in production in 2018 to 1.1m bpd (NOC, 2019). The average production during the Gaddafi 
period was 1.6m bpd (Kabouche, 2018). Libya has signed new contracts with Siemens to 
stabilise its electricity generation with a deal for 1.3GW of power (Siemens, 2017) and 
international reconnections are being redeveloped. The country aims to develop renewable 
energy and announced plans for a new CSP and PV power plants in the Misrata Free Zone 
(CSP Today, 2018) 
Meanwhile, as of the end of 2018, 1.62 million Libyans remained affected by the 
country’s on-going civil war. There are still around than 200,000 internally displaced people 
(IDPs) scattered across the country, with limited to no access to food, fuel, electricity, water, 
health care and public services (UNOCHA, 2018). Libya is also a destination country for 
migrants en-route from neighbouring and West African states whose conditions have 
worsened over time. The political instability and the dominant role criminal networks and 
armed militias have come to play in local economies due to the absence of a central 
government and the rule of law has turned Libya into a breeding ground for human 
trafficking and people’s smuggling (IOM, 2018). 
 
 
IV. Syria  
 
While not blessed with the hydrocarbon wealth of other countries in the MENA region, Syria 
has some oil reserves and the potential for more discoveries, although the oil is sour and 
relatively expensive to refine. Agriculturally, Syria is poor with usable cropland making up 
only about 10 percent of the surface. Prolonged droughts and failing crops exacerbated 
internal conflict in the lead up to civil war. Before the war, Syria was a fast-growing, lower-
middle-income country, although one marred by gender and economic inequalities, high 
levels of corruption, and one of the lowest labour force participation rates in the world (Onder 
et al., 2017). The war destroyed or damaged much of the existing infrastructure, especially in 
the hydrocarbon and power sectors – oil production dropped from 383,000 bpd in 2010 to 
10,000 bpd in 2016 – as well as in agriculture, leading to a dramatic contraction of the 
economy (Ibid.). Since the onset of war in 2011, over half the country’s population has been 
forcibly displaced, making it the largest such crisis anywhere since World War II and 





History of energy politics 
 
Following independence from France in 1946, Syria nationalised its oil industry in 1964 and 
placed it under administration by the state-run Syrian General Petroleum Company (SGPC). 
Oil fields begun to produce in 1968, shipping crude via pipeline to the Mediterranean port of 
Tartus (also the site of Russia’s only oversees naval base with full sovereign rights and 
immunity from Syrian laws). Since the 1970s, the government’s policy had been to support 
hydrocarbon development as an important source of revenue, though not as strongly as in 
Iraq or Libya, owing to far fewer reserves. Yet despite relatively small oil production – 
386,000 bpd in 2010 according to the IMF (Gobat and Kostial, 2016) – this still accounted for 
just over 20 percent of state income. 
The growth in oil exports as an important source of state revenues peaked, as 
elsewhere, between 1973-4 when global oil prices experienced a sharp increase. Around this 
time, international companies, first Romanian and then Western, were allowed to return to the 
country including Shell and Chevron, both of which won concessions in the 1980s (Collelo, 
1987). Petroleum export value increased by 20 times during this period before slowing in the 
1980s as prices stabilized. During this time, local demand reduced net earnings from oil 
supplies and in 1985 the government issued price increases ranging from 27 – 63 percent for 
various petroleum products (UNDP/ World Bank, 1986). Such reforms increased the pressure 
on large swaths of the population, especially in rural areas that became relatively poorer as a 
result, a factor which likely contributed to the current civil war (Matar and Kali, 2018). 
Throughout the 1990s, oil consumption rose steadily and was subsidised, along with gas, at a 
cost of around 13 – 15 percent of GDP according to figures from the IMF provided in 2006 
(Moalla-Fetini et al., 2006). Production peaked at an all-time high of 667,000 bpd in 2002 
(Meliksetian, 2018a). 
Perhaps more importantly, Syria served as a vital oil transit and distribution hub, 
bringing with it some rent but also political clout. Indeed, before the oil crises in the 1970s, 
Syria was earning more from pipelines than from its domestic oil production. Of these, the 
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (from Saudi Arabia to Lebanon) inaugurated in the 1950s was once 
the most important but stopped functioning in 1990. Crossing via Homs (which also refined 
oil from 1959 onwards) was the more important Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline. 
From the 1950s until the early 1980s the pipeline provided massive amounts of revenue to the 
government (Collelo, 1987). Syria stopped accepting Iraqi petroleum exports in 1982 after 
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reaching a deal with Iran (a move designed to harm the former’s war efforts against Iran). 
This followed a shaky relationship and a series of renegotiated terms throughout the 1970s, as 
Iraq was frequently left with little leverage over Syria and forced to seek alternative export 
routes via Turkey (Stevens, 2003). At its height, 300,000 bpd were pumped from Iraq via 
Syria.  
In the 1980s, a number of concessions were awarded to foreign firms for exploration 
of Syria’s gas reserves located largely in the country’s Northeast. Before the civil war, the 
country generally produced as much gas as it consumed – mainly for electricity production. 
Syria switched from oil to gas for electricity production in the 2000s before the outbreak of 
armed conflict. But with the civil war under way, electricity generation halved, while 
consumption dropped by more than half (IEA, 2016b). Prior to the war, the Assad regime had 
made moves to diversify the economy further – growing demand-supply gaps to 
underinvestment in generation capacity and transmission/distribution, coupled with rampant 
corruption and a growing divide between subsidised urban populations and neglected rural 
areas were already major problems then.  
 
Institutions and social capital  
 
There is significant doubt that the regime will be able to control its own affairs and ensure 
peace and stability once the fighting ends. As a consequence of the civil war, Syria has been 
“transformed from a ‘shadow state’ dominated by the security apparatus into a ‘transactional 
state’ dominated by regime-aligned profiteers” including internal armed groups as well as 
external powers both of whom have contributed to a hollowing out of state institutions 
(Kathib and Sinjab, 2018). As of today, the Assad regime clings on to power thanks to its 
control of the capital, large population centres in central and western Syria and backing from 
Russia and Iran, the former of which secured exclusive oil and gas production rights in the 
country through an energy cooperation agreement signed in early 2018 (Katona, 2018), while 
the latter has supplied fuel and basic goods in addition to loans and military support for the 
Assad regime, while pushing to construct an oil refinery near the city of Homs. The loss of 
control over energy resources (in the East, principally Deir al-Zour and the Kurdish 
controlled areas in the northeast), the regime’s inability to maintain sustained power 
generation capacity, and the heavy reliance on external players (Iran and Russia) have further 
exacerbated the loss of authority and institutional capacity. Therefore, despite the conflict 
evolving in favour of the Assad regime in recent years, state institutions are not returning to 
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old strength but rather remain significantly weakened with implications for Syria’s ability to 
reconstruct energy infrastructure in an equitable, inclusive and sustainable way.  
Public trust in state institutions has been severely undermined due to abuse of power, 
corruption, poor governance, and a very limited provision of public services. High youth 
unemployment and mass migration and the disruption of formal and informal economic 
networks are further major problems. According to the Syrian Centre for Policy and Research 
(based in Damascus until 2016), 470,000 people have been killed in the war. More than half 
of Syria’s 2010 population has been forcibly replaced (Onder et al., 2017). With the 
government responsible for the overwhelming majority of deaths, widespread use of torture 
and chemical weapons, it is unlikely to have much social capital left among ordinary citizens 
who are instead gripped by fear.  
 The breakdown of electricity, fuel and water provision and the related deterioration in 
living conditions has contributed to the sense of intense insecurity felt across the country. The 
Syrian people today are extremely energy insecure. Domestic oil production collapsed during 
the war, there is an on-going struggle over control of oil and gas production and transmission 
and the electricity infrastructure (power plants, transmission and distribution lines, and 
transformer stations) has been decimated. The IMF has assessed that damage to the energy 
sector through to December 2014 has been between US $648 million to US $791 million 
(Gobat and Kostial, 2016). By 2013 over 30 power stations in the country were inactive and 
40 percent of its high voltage lines had been attacked according to the government (Ibid.). 
Natural gas, coal, hydro, biofuels and waste, and primary and secondary fuel supply sources 
have all dropped considerably between 2010 and 2016 and fallen to lows comparable to 1990 
as IEA statistics indicate. Before the outbreak of war, Syria was largely electrified, with 95 
percent of homes connected to the grid. But this changed during years of conflict, with 
Syrians now largely reliant on polluting and expensive diesel generators to keep the lights on. 
Even where the grid still reaches electricity provision is highly unreliable, with frequent 
power outages undermining economic and social life (Hanna and Alkhshali, 2016). The lack 
of fuel has led to some more innovative local solutions, including diesel fuel produced from 
boiling and distilling fluid from plastic bags and containers, and installing solar panels to 
power hospitals (Bar’el, 2017). According to the “Social Degradation in Syria” report 
launched in 2017 by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR), the breakdown of trust 
and loss of social capital is greatest in the areas most affected by war and armed conflict, 
including Raqqa and Hasakah in the now SDF-controlled northeast, and smallest around the 
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governates of Damascus and Tartus where there has been comparatively little exposure to 
fighting and electricity and water have continued to be provided to a far greater extent. 
 
Spatial, local and cross-border dynamics 
 
Syria is geographically divided into areas controlled by the Assad regime, rebel forces, 
Turkish and Kurdish forces and ISIL remnants, all of which threaten the territorial integrity 
of the country. As noted above, most of the oil and gas in Syria is situated in the east and 
northeast of the country, while refining capabilities and oil export terminals are under the 
Assad regime’s control. The refineries served more widely inhabited urban areas to the south 
of the country prior to the war. Partition of the country in line with US plans has expressly 
been argued against by the Assad regime, Turkey, Russia and Iran (Meyer, 2018). Yet while 
there are no significant demands to change the country’s territorial status quo (apart from the 
US discourse), the ongoing conflict “has had deeply transformative effects on the borders of 
the country” (Vignal, 2017). Indeed, borderlands which once only held marginal importance, 
have now become critically important due to the presence of different powers, their ongoing 
struggle over control and the introduction of millions of Syrians due to forced migration 
(Ibid.). This has created new demands for the provision of basic services (including 
electricity) in those regions. 
 Early on in the war, the Assad regime cut off electricity transmission lines from 
Turkey, Egypt and Jordan in what was up to then an ambitious cross-border power 
integration project (Haydar, 2012). There are long standing grid interconnections between 
Iraq and Syria, and by extension Iran, that would be important to any economic recovery in a 
post-war scenario. Reports have demonstrated that cross-border oil trade between Syria’s 
mainly Kurdish areas in the northeast and then on to Iraq’s northern autonomous Kurdish 
region (both US-backed) is ongoing. The oil, having been refined in Iraq, eventually makes 
its way on to Turkey. This has continued throughout the war and proved a major boon for 
local PYD/SDF forces who are profiting off the oil rent. Other cross-border activity with Iran 
has been a lifeline to the Assad regime. It has benefited from Iranian oil shipments to the tune 
of 70,000 bpd at the beginning of the war to as much as 150,000 bpd as reported by 
Bloomberg in September 2018 (Gabel and Adesnik, 2018). Iran provides the oil which 




 Despite recent territorial gains by the government in 2018, many other challenges to 
regime authority remain as local and global powers find themselves progressively entrenched 
in the stalemate. Turkey-backed opposition groups remain dominant, especially in the north-
western regions and in the governate of Idlib in particular which today has a population of 2.5 
million. Following significant destruction, local municipalities in Homs, Aleppo and 
elsewhere have recently been able to at least partially repair their electricity grids but 
electricity production remains far behind pre-civil war days (Balanche, 2017). Syria’s rural 
areas and small towns faced neglect in the years and decades preceding armed conflict, with a 
lack of access to public services and high unemployment seen as particular problems. The 
resulting migration into cities created demands for services which urban areas didn’t have the 
capacity to meet (Ibid.). Reconstruction in rural as well as in urban areas will, however, 
require a weakened state to cooperate with local power brokers which threatens to complicate 
progress. Meanwhile, recently recaptured Daraa – the site of the original protests that sparked 
the civil war – has recently seen the return of popular protest and a string of hit-and-run 





The modern Republic of Yemen was established only in 1990, after the northern part of 
Yemen merged with the southern part, then under communist rule. Despite the public 
appearance of a unified nation-state administering the country, socio-economic cleavages, 
exacerbated by a weak state apparatus constrained by alternative power centers rooted in 
long-established patronage networks, led to constant rifts between different interest groups. 
Oil rent played a critical role in President Ali Abd Allah Saleh’s hold onto power from 1978 
to 2012.  Between 2010 and 2012, hydrocarbons constituted 63 percent of government 
revenues and 89 percent of the country’s export revenues (EIA, 2017). Several uprisings and 
revolutions since 1994 culminated in a civil war which has raged since 2014 and has directly 
killed an estimated 13,500 to 80,000 people (Ward, 2019). The years of war have brought the 
country to the brink of complete collapse and created a humanitarian catastrophe of enormous 
proportions. All sides involved in the conflict have tried to weaponize the economy by not 
only meddling with fuel prices and energy supply but also through blocking supply routes for 




History of energy politics 
 
Oil production in Yemen became significant in 1988, when the country produced 173,000 
bpd. Prior to unification, the northern and southern parts of Yemen had relied on the export of 
labour to hydrocarbon-rich states in the region, especially neighbouring Saudi Arabia. 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states expelled 
nearly a million Yemeni workers to punish the regime for its support of Iraq which led to a 
collapse in oil-based remittances flowing back to Yemen (Ohkruhlik and Conge, 1997, see 
also Ibrahim, 1990). However, this was counteracted by Yemen’s own oil boom. While 
overall oil reserves are comparatively small, their exploitation still helped bring about 
substantial economic growth of around five percent per year between 1990 and 2010 
(Perkins, 2016). But this growth failed to benefit a majority of Yemenis who, despite massive 
population growth, urbanization and growing demand for basic goods and services, saw their 
access to fuel and water decline ever further (Ibid.). The exploration of oil peaked in 2001 
due to a combination of maturing fields and growing political instability. 80 percent of the 
country’s oil reserves are concentrated in the Masila Basin in southeastern Yemen. 
Importantly, the Saleh regime relied heavily on oil revenues to support a patronage system 
built out of necessity: the government’s reach didn’t extend far beyond major cities and 
towns and rural areas were controlled by tribes. To ensure continued stability, Saleh ceded 
power to tribal leaders and enabled them to influence decisions and leverage their position to 
extract rents from the state (Phillips, 2008).   
Rebel groups increasingly attacked the country’s energy infrastructure after 2009, 
which resulted in a drastic decline in production output in the oil sector. Declining oil 
revenues were somewhat offset by positive developments in the gas sector. Gas has been 
exploited in Yemen since the 1990s. However, 98 percent of the gas was reinjected to support 
the lifting of oil. This changed in 2009 when Yemen established the first LNG plant and 
began producing gas in commercial quantities. Frequent attacks on Yemen’s energy transport 
infrastructure have undermined these developments (EIA, 2017). Foreign lifters such as Total 
and Nexen, a subsidiary of China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), dominated 
the country’s oil and gas sector before they evacuated from Yemen in the context of the 2014 
Houthi government take-over following weeks of protest over controversial fuel price rises. 
By 2015, most foreign companies had either left the country or begun to close down their 
facilities (Said and Almasmari, 2015). Frequent attacks and acts of sabotage against the 
country’s energy infrastructure have led to fuel shortages and power outages even though the 
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country has seen an increase in imported oil as a result of its domestic supply channels no 
longer being reliable.  
The quality of Yemen’s electricity grid is poor due to years of neglect, a chronic lack 
of investment and acts of sabotage and attacks. At the time of writing, Yemen had the lowest 
number of citizens with access to electricity in the region. Official figures released in 2016 
stated that 52 percent of citizens had access to electricity (Al-Barashi et al., 2016) but a US-
Energy Administration Information assessment put that figure at 40 percent a year later (EIA, 
2017). In any case, even the population supplied with electricity has had to put up with 
regular power outages (Ibid.).  
 
Institutions and social capital 
 
State institutions in Yemen have essentially ceased to exist since the outbreak of the civil war 
in 2014. Government finances have come under severe strain after the Central Bank of 
Yemen (CBY) ceased to operate in late 2016. Bureaucrats receive their salary sporadically if 
at all. Public service investment including in energy infrastructure has come “to a complete 
stop” (World Bank, 2016). Political instability and the highly volatile security environment 
have brought tremendous suffering to Yemen’s population. As of 2017, over 50 percent of 
Yemenis were food insecure and the population’s already high disease burden increased 
further. Food and medication shortages have ensued as a result of blockages of ports by 
Houthi rebels and overland supply routes by the Saudi Arabian government. In the aftermath 
of the Houthi take-over, the country’s energy sector, never a beacon for efficiency and good 
governance to begin with, fell into complete disarray. Several oil refineries stopped 
production after being seized by Houthi rebels while the country’s only liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) plant shut down. The frequent attacks and acts of sabotage on Yemen’s energy 
infrastructure have driven up demand for imported oil and gas in recent years (EIA, 2017).  
Theoretically, the country’s oil and gas sector is under the auspices of Yemen’s 
Ministry of Oil and Minerals. The ministry issues regulations pertaining to oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation and enters production contracts with foreign lifters. The 
parliament needs to approve government contracts with foreign lifters. There is a national oil 
company, Yemen General Corporation for Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources, which 
participates in the sector through several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (EIA, 2017). 
However, the civil war since 2014 has rendered the national oil company powerless. 
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Corruption and rent-seeking have been systemic and endemic in Yemen for decades. During 
the long reign of Ali Abd Allah Saleh, vast patronage networks formed and eventually 
became entrenched in government institutions. Criminal activities, including fuel smuggling, 
were conducted at the highest level of government. For instance, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the 
vice-president of Yemen at the time of writing, had been named by the US-government as 
one of the country’s most notorious fuel (and arms) smugglers prior to the outbreak of the 
civil war in 2014 (Freedom House, 2018). Due to the collapse of Yemen’s formal economy 
as a result of the civil war, black market activities have increased considerably. While Yemen 
has various anti-corruption laws and regulations in place, the state does not have the capacity 
(or the will) to enforce them (Nasarre, 2017; UNPAN, 2011).  
In addition to corruption being systemic and endemic, accountability and transparency 
are low. The collapse of a national government as well as intimidation and oppression of the 
media have not only rendered government decision making more opaque but have assured 
that there is little left in terms of checks-and-balances that would contain the worst of 
government abuses. The media, never strong to begin with, does no longer have the capacity 
to expose and report on (government) abuse and embezzlement pertaining to the energy 
sector (Nasarre, 2017). 
The provision of public services that was already rudimentary prior to the civil war 
has deteriorated further. There is an acute food and energy supply crisis across the territory of 
Yemen and the formal government has essentially lost its capacity to guarantee the import of 
food and energy resources which has further strained what little there was left of trust in state 
institutions. The import of food and energy supplies is now largely organized through private 
channels, which is the reason why food and energy supply are not only unreliable but also 
highly skewed towards people with connections to politically powerful groups (World Bank, 
2017b). 
As of late 2018, 22 million out of a total population of 28.25 million were in need of 
assistance of some sorts. In addition to 78 percent of the population being in need of help, 
around 10,000 people become infected with Cholera every week. An estimated 1.2 million 
people had Cholera by late 2018, while thousands had already died from the disease. This 
was largely the result of the fact that 16 million Yemeni lack access to clean drinking water 
and basic sanitation (Coats, 2019: 34). Furthermore, the risk of a massive famine has 
increased considerably throughout 2018, putting more than 14 million people at risk of 
starvation in 2019 (Salisbury, 2018). Furthermore, the formal labor market has collapsed. 
While reliable unemployment figures were unavailable at the time of writing, youth 
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unemployment stood at 70 percent before the war broke out (Ibid.). The World Bank 
estimated that the country’s economy has contracted by around 40 percent since the onset of 
the civil war in 2014 but official statistics can no longer be obtained (World Bank, 2016).  
 
Spatial, local and cross-border dynamics 
 
Yemen features prominently in the most recent US-government threat assessment report, 
which was released in January 2019. Armed conflict between different groups supported by 
regional powers such as Iran, Saudia Arabia and the UAE as well as international players 
such as the US and UK, do not only threaten the country’s population but are likely to have 
broader ramifications if the issue remains unaddressed. Concretely, Al-Qa‘ida affiliates 
remain present in Yemen, while Iranian arms support for the Houthi rebel group has 
increased their capacity to escalate the conflict beyond the borders of Yemen. Houthi rebel 
groups, for instance, now have the capacity to attack ships passing through the strategically 
important Bab el Mandeb Strait (Coats, 2019). Blocking this strategic route which leads to 
the Suez Canal would potentially impact the passage of millions of barrels of oil per day, 
with severe repercussions for energy supply to Europe. Such a scenario would only 
exacerbate the serious challenges the Yemeni population is facing. The US-government 
report also concluded that an end to the conflict in Yemen was highly unlikely as none of the 
feuding parties had shown any willingness to make concessions that would pave the way for 
a lasting peace agreement. Consequently, “the humanitarian crisis will continue” (Ibid.). 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, the UN and others have pledged financial support to alleviate 
suffering in the form of providing food and supplying hospitals and other basic service 
providers with fuel and other energy. However, much of the aid has failed to reach the 
intended recipients due to corruption by all sides who hinder delivery, loot and sell food and 
fuel on the black market instead (Dehghan and McVeigh, 2017).  
Over the past several years, local tribal leaders immediately resisted any plans of the 
Houthi rebels to form a broad coalition government under their auspices. Historically, oil 
profits from fields in southern and eastern provinces went to Sanaa-based elites. Early in the 
civil war, the Houthis seized some of the fields but over the course of 2015 they were 
displaced by forces loyal to President Hadi. Export terminals, meanwhile, are either badly 
damaged or under Houthi control, as is the main pipeline transporting oil from Marib 
province (Hatem and Wabl, 2018). Against this backdrop, “there can be scant hope of 
Yemeni oil and gas operations getting back to anything like normal for many months – even 
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if a new central government emerges in Sana’a and the country’s energy sector management 
can get back to work” (Butt, 2015). This claim holds true in 2019: while oil production and 
export could be ramped up reasonably quickly and some international hydrocarbon 
companies such as OMV have a made a cautious return, the prevailing security situation and 
continuing contestation, including the ongoing battle between Houthis and the Saudi-Emirati 
coalition over Yemen’s main port at Hodeidah, mean only limited amounts are currently 
brought to market.  
 Yemen’s geographical location make solar- and wind-power viable options for 
broadening the country’s energy mix and reduce its dependency on oil for power generation. 
Concretely, solar radiation in Yemen is considerably higher than in many other parts of the 
MENA region while the country’s aridity assures a high number of sunshine hours per year 
(Nematollahi et al., 2016). Wind power potential is also higher than in many other parts of 
the region (Ibid.). While the government tried to build several wind farms prior to the 
outbreak of the civil war to prove the feasibility of wind farming across the country, the 
conflict that erupted in 2014 has brought most commercial solar and wind farm projects to a 
halt.  The recent boom Yemen has seen with regard to solar power (Badiei, 2018) is not so 
much the result of a concerted government effort but a reflection of the poor quality and 
unreliability of the country’s national energy grid, which has only been exacerbated by the 
civil war. Since Yemeni cannot rely on government energy supply, many have resorted to 
solar energy and the creation of local minigrids that generate and supply energy locally. In 
short, while there has been an interest by foreign investors in Yemen’s alternative energy 
sector, including solar- and hydro-power, the abysmal security situation across the country 
has prevented such plans from coming to fruition (EIA, 2017).    
 
 
VI. The Energy-Climate-Water-Food Risk Nexus 
 
Climate change is beginning to turn MENA’s already challenging environment into one that 
is increasingly unsustainable. Temperatures already reach 50˚C in the summer months, 
creating an unprecedented demand for cooling – a demand which is not met in the four 
country cases. Accessible freshwater has fallen by two thirds over the past 40 years, with the 
per capita availability of water 10 times less than the global average (Kamal, 2017). 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 5th Assessment Report 
(2014), further increases in temperature, an increase in the number of heat wave days, a 
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further significant reduction in precipitation and prolonged droughts are all set to materialize 
in the region under a business as usual scenario. This poses serious challenges to human 
health and livelihoods, food production, energy generation, infrastructure and the effective 
provision of a range of public services.  
The interdependencies between energy, water, food and climate are critical in terms of 
effective reconstruction in the region. Development policy has evolved to ensure that the risk 
of climate change is integrated into energy, water and food development (van Aalst, 2004). In 
a region where there are high proportions of displaced people, humanitarian crises, significant 
damage to infrastructure overall and a failure to implement widely accepted and legitimate 
governance frameworks, the need to address the energy, water, food and climate risk nexus is 
critical and yet the countries reviewed herein have little adaptive capacity to do so. For 
example, Yemen, one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, has been 
experiencing a massive water and health crisis due to energy shortages as water pumping 
stations are running out of fuel (UNICEF, 2017). Over the medium to long-term, changes in 
weather patterns are threatening to further damage existing agricultural systems, while water 
availability can have an impact on oil and gas production, and increased transportation costs 
can impact export revenues (FAO, 2008; Appert and Favennec, 2005). Further afield, the 
increasing desertification of the Sahel region of Africa is set to lead to increased economic 
migration due to falling clean water and food supplies (Siddiqi and Annadon, 2011).  
Vulnerable regions such as MENA face multiple stresses at the same time – climate 
change can act as a risk multiplier for pre-existing conflict, poverty and unequal access to 
resources, weak institutions, food insecurity and the incidence of disease (Jackson, 2009). 
Scenarios considered by the UN include limited or threatened access to energy increasing the 
risk of conflict, a scarcity of food and water transforming peaceful competition into violence, 
and floods and droughts sparking massive human migrations, polarizing societies and 
weakening the ability of countries to resolve conflicts peacefully (UNEP, 2012).  
Therefore, not addressing sustainability, resilience and adaptive capacity in 
reconstruction efforts could result in a further weakening of the regional economy. The 
International Renewable Energy Association’s Global Commission on the Geopolitics of 
Energy Transformation warned in 2019 that the geopolitical and socio-economic 
consequences of a new energy age may be as profound as those which accompanied the shift 
from biomass to fossil fuels two centuries ago (IRENA, 2019). As countries develop 
renewables and increasingly integrate their electricity grids with neighbours, new 
interdependencies and trade patterns will emerge. It is possible that oil and gas-related 
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conflict may decline, and it may be that a shift in the focus of energy, water and food 
provision to a local level could be beneficial in the region (Ibid.).  
 
 
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This paper has identified a number of challenges that are preventing Iraq, Libya, Syria and 
Yemen from realising their potential. All four countries suffer from a lack of effective, 
trusted institutions, a focus on tribal and/or sectarian loyalties which has underpinned corrupt 
practices, a continued focus on hydrocarbon rents as a means of survival, an underinvestment 
in energy (especially non-hydrocarbon) infrastructure, internal strife and ongoing energy, 
water and food insecurity. In all four cases, civil war exacerbated problems that had already 
been decades in the making. To the casual eye these are crises for the four countries and their 
citizens. Yet, the knock-on effects on migration, human trafficking, regional and international 
trade and security mean that outside involvement will continue. Current approaches include 
support from different governments, the UN, international financial institutions as well as 
non-state actors. A meaningful, overarching regional security arrangement would be highly 
desirable to provide the stability needed for effective reconstruction to take place, yet the 
vastly diverging interests and persistent antagonisms between local, national and regional 
powers and their international backers make such an arrangement difficult to achieve. In its 
absence, there remains an urgent need to address core issues that have so far overwhelmed 
the four countries and their populations. 
From an energy perspective, effective reconstruction will not be achieved through 
meeting only short-term objectives, although humanitarian relief and more immediate crisis 
response measures are critically necessary in the current environment. The economies of the 
four countries need to be shored up in order to address grievances, enable growth and defend 
against increased radicalisation for years and decades to come. Focus must be on the long-
term sustainable provision of energy and water, goods and services from the bottom up. 
Given the constraints under which the region operates, it may be time to take a more 
federalist and distributed approach to governance, backed by development of a more 
decentralized and democratised energy, water and economic framework. 
Longer term approaches that build capacity for and understanding of sustainable 
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practices give both urban and rural communities a stake and common purpose, enhance their 
energy security and resilience to external shocks, and promote inclusive economic 
development. The following lists a number of recommendations. 
 
1. Support economic diversification: This includes greater efforts in transport and 
communication, education, agriculture and services. Critically, however, it is also the energy 
sector itself that needs to be diversified. Examples include using natural gas more effectively 
to displace oil in a number of applications – Libya and Iraq still flare large amounts of gas 
rather than use it for electricity generation; build out renewables to tap into the region’s solar 
energy potential – electricity demand for cooling is highest in the early afternoon when solar 
PV output is greatest, making solar an ideal choice to match peak demand with supply; and 
switching from petrochemical refineries to biorefineries to produce fuel and power from 
agricultural residue and waste. 
 
2. Support more decentralized power generation: Connected to diversification, 
decentralization is an important measure to increase energy system resilience by making 
energy supply less vulnerable to inefficient grid transmission, brownouts and blackouts that 
come as the result of outdated and damaged national electricity grids across all cases. In 
addition, it would make power supply less vulnerable to attacks and acts of sabotage, both of 
which are of direct concern to Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. In many cases, off-grid solar PV 
or mini-grids made up of smaller scale solar-hybrid generation power plants offer effective 
ways to help meet existing needs, empower local communities, and reduce energy poverty. 
However, such decentralization activities require consistent, active government support. 
 
3. Support solutions for displaced people: This will require addressing medium-term socio-
economic issues at hand, from vulnerability to work and energy access. The financing of 
projects to maintain livelihoods and to strengthen community-based institutions could play a 
powerful role in reconstruction. 
 
4. Support greater cross-border power trade: The availability of sufficient amounts of 
electricity at affordable prices plays an important role in the reconstruction of all four cases. 
However, state and quasi-state actors in none of the countries are currently able to meet the 
growing needs of households and businesses. Rebuilding power generation capacity, building 
new power plants, improving and expanding the grid while also incentivizing off-grid 
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measures will take some time and bringing in more energy from neighbouring countries is an 
important step to bridge gaps in the short to medium term. However, there are also important 
long-term benefits to cross-border energy cooperation such as improved reliability of supply 
and greater resilience to external shocks, lower costs, and the political surplus that comes as a 
result of economic integration between regional neighbours as experienced in the case of the 
EU. Examples of and experience with successful interconnection exist in Iraq, Libya and 
Syria though there are many more gains to be had.   
 
5. Support greater policy capacity and learning: If a more diverse, resilient, low-carbon 
energy economy is to emerge from the rubble, supportive policies and measures will have to 
be in place at various levels of political authority. Experience with low-carbon energy 
technologies and measures to improve energy system resilience is low across the cases and 
necessary policies are often either lacking or in need of adjustment. This includes anything 
from financial support schemes such as feed-in tariffs and well-designed PPAs to the creation 
of a market for renewables through removing hydrocarbon subsidies and market liberalisation 
measures. Decision-makers and bureaucrats will need to be trained to design effective, 
reliable approaches that provide investors with certainty. This could include support for 
policy learning from successful cases in MENA such as Morocco, for example through 
workshops.  
 
6. Improve data and skills: For sustainable finance flows to materialise and investors to put 
their money into projects on the ground, more information about local conditions, risks and 
opportunities is needed. This is especially the case in the non-hydrocarbon sectors of the 
(energy) economy which are underdeveloped and with little available data due to the 
historical focus on hydrocarbon rent. Across MENA there is a lack of evidence on the value 
of resilience-based measures coupled with a lack of experience and capacity among decision 
makers on how best to design and deliver effective interventions. The necessary knowledge 
and skills need to be built in conjunction with measures to support greater policy capacity and 
learning.   
 
7. Support improved urban planning: Reconstruction efforts in the heavily destroyed cities 
and towns of the four country cases present an opportunity to introduce sustainable 
approaches to housing, mobility, electricity grids, sanitation and more. Effective urban 
planning improves the efficient use of scarce resources from energy to water and will provide 
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significant benefit to the overall economy. Understanding and implementing the enabling 
factors that allow for the development of climate resilient infrastructure will be key.  
 
8. Establish/ support policy dialogues: National and local stakeholders will need to explore 
a range of policy, governance and cooperation approaches. Multi-stakeholder approaches 
around the world need to be assessed in order to identify what lessons can be learned and 
used. The region is dominated by a tangle of different conflicts, agendas and goals. Academic 
approaches such as the Westphalia Project may also provide some useful lessons by focusing 
on the importance of an agreed means of dispute resolution. 
 
9. Establish/ support cross sector links: Effective cross-sectoral linkages must play a major 
role in the redevelopment and reconstruction of the region, a crucial challenge given the 
localisation of governance structures within countries, let alone across the region. Climate 
change, water and energy issues can only effectively be addressed in an integrated way. 
Considering the outlook for the region, existing institutional challenges make it unlikely that 
the current development path will be effective in the long term. Practical local solutions to 
challenges in addressing access to water and power will become critical if the region is to 
recover, and work must also be done in terms of addressing the regional need for adaptation 
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